

A New Document on the Deportation and Murder of Jews during “Einsatz Reinhardt” 1942

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A recently discovered document sheds new light on *Einsatz Reinhardt*, the murder of the Jews in the General Government. For the first time detailed statistics on the 1942 killings in the extermination camps of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka, and in the Concentration Camp Lublin–Majdanek, as compiled by Nazi officials, are available. The reliability of the numbers appears confirmed by a consideration of the related research of other historians. The authors analyze the document in its wider historical context, raising issues that call for further research.

The Background

A recently discovered document on *Einsatz Reinhardt*, the murder of the Jews in the General Government, is of fundamental importance for any discussion of the numbers of Jewish victims in Poland. For the first time we have detailed figures, as compiled by Nazi officials, for the 1942 killings in the extermination camps of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka, and the Concentration Camp Lublin–Majdanek. Some deaths at Majdanek are here included as part of *Einsatz Reinhardt*. The sum total given in this document equals the total number in the so-called Korherr Report, written by Himmler’s statistician Richard Korherr and later (in all probability) presented by Himmler to Hitler. This document adds to our understanding of the *Einsatz Reinhardt* extermination camps in Poland, and of the channels of information about the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” leading up to the highest levels, including “the Führer” himself.

This document was uncovered among recently declassified material at the Public Record Office in Kew, England, and comprises two partially intercepted “state secret” radio messages from Lublin, General Government. Both are dated January 11, 1943, the second following within five minutes of the first. One was addressed to SS Lieutenant Colonel Eichmann at Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) Berlin, and the other to SS Lieutenant Colonel Heim, deputy commander of the Security Police and SD for the General Government in Cracow. It was sent by SS Major Höfle, staff member of the SS and Police Leader (SSPF) in Lublin. Due to receiving problems,

MOST SECRET.ZIP/GPDD 355a/ 15.1.43. 1.

KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE

This document is to receive OX/MSS Security Treatment.

GERMAN POLICE DECODES; No. 3 Traffic; 11.1.43.

I. TRAFFIC.

GPDD 355a 2.

12. OMX de OMQ 1000 89 ? ?
Geheime Reichssache! An das Reichssicherheitshauptamt, zu
Händen SS Obersturmbannführer EICHMANN, BERLIN ...rest missed..

13/15. OLQ de OMQ 1005 83 234 250
Geheime Reichssache! An den Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspol.,
zu Händen SS Obersturmbannführer HEIM, KRAKAU.
Betr: 14-tägige Meldung Einsatz REINHART. Bezug: dort.
Pa. Zugang bis 31.12.42, L 12761, B 0, S 515, T 10335 zusammen
23611. Stand... 31.12.42, L 24733, B 434508, S 101370,
T 71355, zusammen 1274166.
SS und Pol.führer LUBLIN, HOEFLE, Sturmbannführer.

Public Record Office, Kew, England, HW 16/23, decode GPDD 355a distributed on January 15, 1943,
radio telegrams nos 12 and 13/15, transmitted on January 11, 1943 Government Code and Cypher
School German Police Section Decrypts of German Police Communications during Second World War
See translation below

12 OMX de OMQ 1000 89 ? ?

State Secret!

To the Reich Main Security Office, for the attention of SS Obersturmbannführer EICH-
MANN, Berlin . rest missed

13/15 OLQ de OMQ 1005 83 234 250

State Secret!

To the Senior Commander of the Security Police [and the Security Service], for the
attention of SS Obersturmbannführer HEIM, CRACOW

Subject: fortnightly report Einsatz REINHART

Reference: radio telegram therefrom

recorded arrivals until December 31, 42,

L [Lublin]	12,761,
B [Belzec]	0,
S [Sobibor],	515,
T [Treblinka]	10 335 [,]
together	23 611

sum total . . [as per] December 31, 42,

L	24 733,
B	434 508,
S	101 370,
T	71 355, [read· 713 555]
together	1 274 166

SS and Police Leader Lublin, HÖFLE, Sturmbannführer

the message to Eichmann was only partially intercepted and decoded by British Intelligence. The second message to Heim is much more complete. Again, this message was only partially intercepted, as can be seen from a gap in the transcription. There is no indication that British intelligence analysts understood the meaning or significance of these two messages ¹

Unfortunately, no similar decode about *Einsatz Reinhardt* operations is to be found within the material declassified to date. We do not wish to pursue here a discussion of the provenance, reliability, and distribution of the German Police Decodes other than to say British Intelligence regarded the decodes as exceptional intelligence gathering, the secrets of which they maintained for more than fifty years

The Telegram

SS Major Hermann Höfle² was a leading staff member working under SS and Police Major General Odilo Globocnik in Lublin. Rather grandly, Höfle's function was called "Head of the Main Section 'Einsatz Reinhardt' under the SS and Police Leader in the Lublin District" (*Leiter der Hauptabteilung "Einsatz Reinhardt" beim SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin*).³ A list of all staff officers of the SS and Police Leader Lublin identified Höfle as a "Section Head for Jewish Affairs – Special Action Reinhardt" (*Referent für Judenangelegenheiten–Sonderaktion Reinhardt*).⁴ Höfle was in charge of almost all relevant activities concerning the murder of the Jews in the General Government: supervising construction work at the extermination camps, presenting them to visitors like Eichmann, preparatory work of "cleansing" the ghettos, in particular coordination of activities with the local civil administration, "cleansing" of the ghettos by Security and Order Police units reinforced by Globocnik's police auxiliaries from the Trawniki training camp, dispatch of trains to the chosen extermination camps, utilization of the properties left by the Jews to be murdered.

The addressee of the radio telegram was SS Lieutenant Colonel Franz Heim,⁵ from September 1941 deputy of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD for the General Government (*Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD*, SS Oberführer Eberhard Schöngarth). The subject of the radio telegram reads "fortnightly report Einsatz REINHART [sic]" The same idiosyncratic spelling *Einsatz*

Reinhardt appears in both the printed and the typewritten office letterheads of Höfle's section in Globocnik's staff.⁶ Whether it reflects Höfle's inability to spell is not clear, though the latter is well documented.⁷ The reference line of the radio message indicates that Höfle was answering a request from Heim in Cracow. As no date is given, the latter may have been sent the same day, January 11, 1943.

Höfle's radio telegram provides us not only with a sum total of the victims of Einsatz Reinhardt in 1942 but for the first time also with precise knowledge of the distribution by extermination camp. The Höfle telegram does not give us the full names of the extermination camps, but only the letters L, B, S, and T. The letters B, S, and T certainly stand for Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka.⁸ Until recently it has been accepted by historians that only these three extermination camps belonged to Globocnik's "*Einsatz Reinhardt*." Now we have a fourth camp—L—obviously the Concentration Camp *Lublin*, commonly known as Majdanek, listed by Höfle ahead of the other three camps.⁹ Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka were extermination camps, so it is reasonable to assume that the numbers given for "L" are numbers of Jews murdered also—it would not make sense to give the numbers killed for three camps and make Lublin an exception.

Who were the 24,733 Jewish victims sent to "L," of whom more than half arrived and were murdered during the last fourteen days of 1942? Were they prisoners of the concentration camp killed in the gas chambers after selections there? It is rather unlikely that such large-scale selections inside the concentration camp, other murders by gassings, or transports of bodies to huge mass graves would have escaped the notice of surviving prisoners. Many of the latter were able to give testimonies after the war, in particular at the Düsseldorf Majdanek trial. As far as can be ascertained, no mass killing exceeding 12,000 Jewish prisoners there before 1943 is mentioned in the rather scarce literature on Majdanek: the victims must have come from somewhere else. The only area whence large transports could have arrived at this time was the Białystok General District. A number of transports were directed indeed from Białystok to Auschwitz and Treblinka, but some might have reached Lublin too. Another possible source, after the dissolution of almost all ghettos, was the remaining small labor camps in the General Government. In mid-November 1942 the communist underground army *Guardia Ludowa* attacked the water administration camp (*Wasserwirtschaftslager*) Janiszow in Krasnik district, where 900 Jewish prisoners were employed at draining marshes. Himmler immediately issued an order to the Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger in Cracow to have all smaller, weakly-guarded camps liquidated.¹⁰ Of forty-two such camps in the Lublin region thirty-eight were dissolved before the end of 1942.¹¹ Most of these had had a capacity of 400 to 600 prisoners in 1941,¹² with a few ranging up to 1,500. But it is doubtful whether this capacity was still employed at the end of 1942. However, we can assume that several thousand Jewish prisoners from the water administration camps fell victim to Himmler's order. In addition, a considerable number of other forced labor camps

were also dissolved. There were dozens of them in the districts of Lublin and Radom, which were closer to Concentration Camp Lublin than to Sobibor or Treblinka (Belzec had already been closed). So the huge numbers of victims at Concentration Camp Lublin in a short period of time may have come from unknown transports from the Bialystok General District or, more likely, from small forced labor camps.

Globocnik must have been responsible for sending these unknown Jewish victims to the gas chambers of Majdanek, because, according to Höfle's telegram, he counted them as Einsatz Reinhardt victims. Taking into consideration that slightly more than half of these Lublin victims were killed during the last fourteen days of the year, the Concentration Camp Lublin might have served Globocnik and his men as an additional killing site, which they might have taken over before the killings at Belzec were stopped. Globocnik halted the deportations of Jews from the ghettos in the district of Lublin on November 9, 1942, the day when about 3,000 Jewish men, women, and children from Majdan Tatarski camp were sent to the Concentration Camp Lublin. From the beginning of November until the closing of Belzec a month later only Galician Jews were still being gassed there.¹³ Unfortunately, reliable information is unavailable, so further research is needed.

The telegram's statistics for the other camps cause fewer problems. The number for *Belzec*, in particular, seems on target as the killings in this camp stopped in December. For this reason the figure of 434,508 must be nearly identical with the actual total number.¹⁴ It is considerably lower than most historians have calculated.¹⁵ Wolfgang Scheffler, who gave expert opinions on the Reinhardt camps and deportations at numerous German trials of Nazi criminals, is an exception. Scheffler arrived at a minimum figure of 441,442 victims from identified towns and villages, and explained that a precise calculation was not possible because of additional unknown transports.¹⁶ Scheffler's minimum figure comes very close to the actual number in Höfle's telegram. If we accept Höfle's figure, we may conclude that any allowance for unknown transports cannot be made. The figure for *Sobibor* in Höfle's radio telegram is 101,370 victims for 1942. Scheffler's minimum figure of 102,577 for 1942 almost matches the actual number.¹⁷

In *Treblinka* 713,555 victims were murdered. The figure 71,355 in Höfle's radio telegram is a typing error or a mistake in the process of decrypting. If the figures for Lublin, Belzec and Sobibor are subtracted from the established sum of 1,274,166, the correct number 713,555 for Treblinka remains, the numeral "5" simply got left off. Historical research had already reached an approximate number: Yitzhak Arad estimated about 763,000 victims up to the end of April 1943, and gives 32,500 for the period between January and April, i.e., 730,500 for 1942.¹⁸ Again there can be no consideration for any unknown transports.

Höfle's telegram also details the killing rate for the last fourteen days of 1942 (*14-tägige Meldung*). Though not as important as the totals for each extermination camp, these numbers provide clues for further research. On December 5, 1942,

Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger cabled a cry for help to Himmler. his SS and Police Leaders (i.e., his subordinates) had unanimously informed him that there would be a cessation of transports in the General Government between December 15, 1942, and at least January 15, 1943, thus endangering the planned “total evacuation” of Jews (Himmler had fixed the date for completion at December 31, 1942). So Krüger entreated his chief to intervene with the *Wehrmacht* High Command (OKW) and the Ministry of Transport to obtain at least three trains (*Zugpaare*¹⁹) for this most urgent task.²⁰ Himmler must have been successful, for the fortnightly report clearly shows there must have been several transports to the camps during this period, a conclusion also supported by other evidence.

As for *Lublin*, we have pointed out the possibility of trains from the Bialystok region or, more likely, from smaller forced labor camps not too far from Lublin itself. As for *Treblinka*, Christian Gerlach has already provided evidence that at least three trains went from the district of Bialystok to Treblinka. A transport from the collection camp Kielbasin is documented, starting on December 14, 1942 and arriving on December 15 at Treblinka, allegedly carrying 7,000 Jews to their death. If their arrival at Treblinka actually took place a day or two later (entirely possible as the date is an estimate), the deportation would fit into the “fortnightly report” of the document. On December 17, 1942, a train left Treblinka via Bialystok to Grodno, presumably to return fully laden again. According to survivor testimony, the last train from Kielbasin left for Treblinka on December 20.²¹

Whereas Treblinka murdered 10,335 victims in the second half of December 1942, for *Sobibor* only 515 are recorded. These Sobibor Jews must be identical with those ascertained by Scheffler, who listed one deportation to Sobibor from Staw on December 22, 1942.²² Details on this deportation emerge from the reports of survivors.²³ It has to be stated that the number 515 accords well with the sources.

It should be noted that the figures in Höfle’s message include only the numbers of murders in the extermination camps. Three of them were devoted extermination camps, where those unable to walk were shot and the huge majority gassed.²⁴ Lublin, however, was a regular concentration camp; from October 1942 three gas chambers were used to murder prisoners after selections of those deemed unable to work. The number culled during selections in Majdanek from October onwards is known: their sum is much lower than the figures given in Höfle’s radio telegram.²⁵ As the document indicates, the murder of Jews transported to Lublin without being registered at the concentration camp became an integral part of *Einsatz Reinhardt* from an unspecified date onward. Further research, one hopes, will hopefully permit more precise information.

In the main, the separate figures for the Reinhardt camps provided by Höfle’s radio telegram can be confirmed by published research. The document is a reliable source and will have to be considered in all future research concerning the numbers of murdered Jews in the General Government. An unknown number of Jews, perhaps

tens of thousands, were shot during the ghetto ‘cleansings’ or in the forests.²⁶ Undoubtedly their number is not included in these statistics

A Note on Terminology and Spellings

The murder of the Jews in the General Government was overseen by SS and Police Leader Lublin Odilo Globocnik between mid-October 1941 and October 19, 1943.²⁷ In 1942 it was given the codenames *Einsatz* or *Aktion Reinhardt*. The language of the killers identified four distinct spheres of operations: “evacuation” (*Aussiedlung*), utilization of labor (*Verwertung der Arbeitskraft*); seizure and utilization of personal belongings (*Sachverwertung*), and confiscation of hidden assets and real estate (*Einbringung verborgener Werte und Immobilien*).²⁸ The new document is concerned only with the first aspect of *Einsatz Reinhardt*, the “evacuations” of the Jews of the General Government from the ghettos and forced labor camps to the extermination camps.²⁹

The subject line of Höfle’s radio telegram reads *Einsatz Reinhart*. The term *Einsatz* was apparently the original one in use from June 1942 on, but certainly less often in 1943; the extermination camps Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka were officially called “camps of *Einsatz Reinhardt*.” New personnel assigned to these camps by the Chancellery of the Führer—that is the euthanasia organization T-4—had to undergo instruction by Hermann Höfle in Lublin and then to sign a secrecy agreement as “specially commissioned persons for the execution of tasks in the resettlement of Jews, *Einsatz Reinhardt*.”³⁰ Officially they were designated “SS-Sonderkommandos *Einsatz Reinhardt*.”³¹ *Einsatz* is the term the perpetrators on Globocnik’s staff used themselves in their correspondence during 1942. On the other hand, the term *Aktion* did not occur before mid-September 1942 as far as we can ascertain. It seems to have been used first in the SS Economics and Administration Main Office (WVHA) and its Inspectorate of Concentration Camps,³² and only later, in 1943, by Globocnik and Himmler themselves.³³ For these reasons, and because the telegram’s subject line itself has *Einsatz*, the authors prefer using this term instead of *Aktion*.

Similarly, the spelling *Reinhardt* is to be recommended instead of *Reinhard* (which was sometimes used by Globocnik and others), or the seemingly more private spelling *Reinhart* appearing in the new document and typically used in Höfle’s office. First of all, it has to be stated that *Einsatz* or *Aktion Reinhardt* was indeed named after the chief of the RSHA and Göring’s “Commissioner for the Total Solution of the Jewish Question in the German Sphere of Influence in Europe,” Reinhard Heydrich.³⁴ What is not widely known is that Heydrich apparently used a different spelling of his first name for some time in the 1930s. In a speech on the occasion of the introduction of Kaltenbrunner as Heydrich’s successor on January 30, 1943, Heinrich Himmler himself told his audience how he first met *Reinhardt* Heydrich in 1930, and specifically mentioned the unusual spelling: “Heydrich had his first name written with a dt.”³⁵ When a rumor arose among party members that the young chief of the Secu-

rity Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*) might be of Jewish descent, an expert was commissioned to do research for Himmler on Heydrich's family and to come up with an authentic and verifiable family tree. Thus a scholarly "Report and List of Ancestors" on "the racial origin of Naval First Lieutenant *Reinhardt* Heydrich" was added to Heydrich's personal SS file.³⁶ Every official *Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP* published by the SS Personnel Main Office between 1934 and 1942 also has *Reinhardt* as his first name. Heydrich himself tried to have these SS officers' lists changed to Reinhard, but in vain.³⁷ As far as is known, the codename *Reinhardt* for the mass murder first appeared immediately after Heydrich's death in June 1942.³⁸ Concerning the spelling, there is irrefutable proof—for German bureaucrats at least, as it had to be approved by the Reich Ministry of the Interior—in the form of one of Globocnik's official stamps displaying the Reich Eagle in the center and the inscription *Der SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin—Einsatz Reinhardt*.³⁹ The most extensive and important file on *Aktion Reinhardt*, the final reports of Globocnik (including two notes by Himmler), have the dt-spelling, in all fifteen times.⁴⁰ Much more documentary evidence is available.⁴¹

The Historical Context

On October 13, 1941 Himmler held a conference at his headquarters in East Prussia with Higher SS and Police Leader for the General Government Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, and SS and Police Leader for Lublin Odilo Globocnik. In all probability this was the occasion when Globocnik received an order from Himmler to start construction work at Belzec, site of the first extermination camp in the General Government.⁴² At the beginning of November 1941 Belzec was erected by Richard Thomalla, Globocnik's construction engineer. His work continued in spring 1942, when he built two more extermination camps, Sobibor and Treblinka.⁴³ The murder by gassing of the Jews started on March 17, 1942, when two trains from Lublin and Lwów (*Lemberg*) reached Belzec. After a successful phase of experimentation at Belzec, the operations were extended to the General Government as a whole between the end of March and the middle of April 1942.⁴⁴ Himmler's "Special Order Reinhardt" (*Sonderauftrag Reinhardt*—no date is given) can be found in an enumeration of Globocnik's various tasks in his files.⁴⁵ When extermination camp Treblinka became operational, Himmler ordered Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger to accelerate the murder of the Jews in the General Government "I order that the resettlement of the entire Jewish population of the General Government be carried out and completed by December 31, 1942."⁴⁶ It is common bureaucratic and military practice to verify that orders had been fulfilled by a fixed date. Himmler certainly expected reports from his SS and police units involved in the mass murder of the Jews in the General Government.

Until recently we have known of the existence of three such reports reaching the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police. The first report was given orally by Eichmann to Himmler in his headquarters near Zhitomir on August 11, 1942.

According to Eichmann, Himmler wanted an “almost general report . . . an entire survey of the work of the Security Police towards the solution of the Jewish Question.”⁴⁷ It is likely that Eichmann spoke about the deportations to the General Government, which was the primary destination of trains from the Reich, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovakia

The second report was the “Operations and Situation Report 1942 on the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question” (*Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht 1942 über die Endlösung der europäischen Judenfrage*) drawn up in Eichmann’s Section IV B 4 at the RSHA and sent to Himmler on December 15, 1942. The document has not been identified and is probably lost. Heading, date, Eichmann’s reference mark, and letter number (IV B 4 – 490/42 gRs. [1618])⁴⁸ are known only from a note by Himmler to Heinrich Muller, provisional chief of the RSHA after Heydrich’s assassination.⁴⁹ In all probability Eichmann devoted at least one passage of his “Operations and Situation Report 1942” to the General Government. In the course of 1942 he had directed at least twenty-six transports of Jews from Germany (at least 24,000), six from Austria (6,000), twenty-five from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (35,000), and thirty-eight from Slovakia (39,000) to ghettos in the General Government: at least ninety-five transports, totaling over 104,000 Jewish men, women, and children.⁵⁰ This was the end of Eichmann’s responsibility. Thereafter it was Globocnik’s task to deport the Jews from these ghettos (e.g., Piaski, Izbica, Opole, Warsaw) to the three extermination camps in the General Government. The deportation of the Polish and other European Jews from these ghettos to the extermination camps in the General Government did not directly involve Eichmann’s office.

The third report known to have reached Himmler stems from the German statistician Dr. Richard Korherr.⁵¹ Only a small part of the report is concerned with the Jews of the General Government, but it is of crucial importance for understanding the new document. Himmler commissioned Korherr orally and by letter on January 18, 1943 to prepare a report on “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question,” adding that “the Reich Security Main Office is to put at your disposal whatever materials you request or need for this purpose.”⁵² Himmler’s additional letter the same day to Gestapo chief Muller expressed an unusually harsh criticism of the statistical endeavors of Eichmann’s Section IV B 4: “The Reich Security Main Office is hereby relieved of its statistical responsibilities in this area, since the statistical materials submitted to date have consistently fallen short of professional standards of precision.”⁵³ In other words, Eichmann was removed from this job because of incompetence. In came the professional Dr. Richard Korherr and his two assistants, who began work in Eichmann’s office at Kurfürstenstrasse 116. In Argentina fifteen years later, Eichmann’s reminiscences of Korherr and his work were rather vague and unenthusiastic.⁵⁴

Korherr’s statistical treatise of sixteen pages covering the period from January 30, 1933 until December 31, 1942, was sent to Himmler’s office on March 23, 1943 as a “first provisional report.”⁵⁵ On April 1, Himmler asked Korherr to prepare a “shortened report for presentation to the *Führer*,” which was delivered to Himmler

in a version of six pages on April 19, now partly covering the period until March 31, 1943.⁵⁶ In all probability the shortened report was presented to Hitler in person by Himmler. Eichmann stated it was typed on the special “Führer typewriter” with extra-large letters at his office.⁵⁷ He claimed to have received the report back annotated by Himmler, “Führer has taken note.”⁵⁸ This is another indication that Hitler was kept informed about the “Final Solution.”

To fully understand Höfle’s telegram we have to take into account Himmler’s criticism of the first, March 23, Korherr report. The Reichsführer-SS rejected several phrases in the sixteen-page paper and had Dr. Rudolf Brandt, the head of his Personal Office, write to Korherr on April 14, 1943:

The Reichsführer-SS has received your statistical report on the “Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem”. He does not wish the words “special treatment of Jews” [*Sonderbehandlung*] to be used at all. On page 9, point 4 the text must read as follows: “Transportation of Jews from the Eastern Provinces to the Russian East. Number of those passed through the camps in the General Government, through the camps in Warthegau.” A different formulation must not appear.⁵⁹

It should be noted that the seemingly harmless euphemism “passed through the camps in the General Government” (*durchgeschleust durch die Lager im Generalgouvernement*) already carried a sinister meaning for insiders in 1942/43. The phrase derives from the common term “transit camps” (*Durchgangslager*).⁶⁰ For example Theresienstadt and Westerbork were officially termed *Durchgangslager*, whence transportation to the East meant in fact dispatch to death. But there are other examples of *Durchgangslager* that served exclusively as killing sites.⁶¹ The extermination camps Sobibor and Chelmno were also designated by this term.⁶² But the euphemism used by Himmler and Korherr was calculated to make outsiders believe that there really were transports “to the Russian East.”

Korherr’s original wording of page 9 point 4 to which Himmler objected is not fully known. Only the corrected version is extant. Korherr must have been too explicit, leaving little doubt that he meant the killings; otherwise Himmler’s objections to the widely familiar term *Sonderbehandlung*⁶³ in a “State Secret” document could not be explained. Korherr changed page 9 of the report as requested. When he sent the corrected version back to Himmler’s office on 28 April, it apparently escaped the Reichsführer’s notice that the objectionable term *Sonderbehandlung* remained on page 10. Apart from this lapse, Korherr used Himmler’s precise wording, only complementing it with numbers:

4 Transportation of Jews from the Eastern Provinces to the Russian East

Number of those who passed	1,449,693
through the camps in the General Government	1,274,166
through the camps in Warthegau	145,301 ⁶⁴

In Korherr's shortened report the "camps in the General Government" are no longer mentioned. Only the number 1,274,166 appears in the table "Emigration, Excess Mortality, and Evacuation," and in the columns "Evacuation" and "General Gov. (with Lemberg)." The "camps in the Warthegau," that is Chelmno, are no longer mentioned and no numbers are given.

Korherr's number of Jewish victims with reference to the "camps in the General Government" exactly matches the total in Höfle's radio telegram. It is worth noting that only five minutes before, at 1000h, the same broadcaster, with the German police call sign "OMQ," identified by British Intelligence as located in Lublin,⁶⁵ had sent another radio telegram, also marked "State Secret," this time to Eichmann in Berlin. It is reasonable to assume that both State Secret radio telegrams, transmitted by the same sender, were in fact identical or almost identical.

In a postwar interview with Willem Sassen in Argentina Eichmann claimed that an unnamed *Regierungsrat*, after completing his statistical report in the IV B 4 office, handed over the total material collected by him:

Obviously there was also information on how many Jews Globocnik had killed in the General Government. Where the Regierungsrat [Korherr] received it from, I do not know.⁶⁶

The documented chronological sequence tells another story: first, Eichmann completed his *Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht 1942*, which Himmler received and rejected. Then he very likely received the numbers concerning the General Government from Höfle on January 11. Korherr could make use of these same numbers when he began work at Eichmann's office a week later. On completion, the Korherr Report was handed over to Himmler and also to Eichmann. In Argentina Eichmann either suffered a lapse of memory or he lied, putting intermediaries between the information about mass extermination and himself. Eichmann probably learned the correct numbers of murdered Jews in the General Government directly through Höfle's radio message.

The authors have not been able to determine whether non-Polish Jews from Germany, Austria, the Protectorate, and Slovakia were included in Höfle's and Korherr's figure. Korherr's statistics are apparently too ambiguous for a decision. On the one hand, his number for Jews deported to Theresienstadt is more than 21,000 smaller than the actual number.⁶⁷ This evident reduction in numbers suggests that at least some of the deportees from Theresienstadt to the Lublin district and Warsaw ghetto are probably included in the Höfle-Korherr number of 1,274,166 victims. On the other hand, Korherr's number of Jews deported from Slovakia comes near to the sum total of Jews actually deported.⁶⁸ At the end of 1942 at least 30,000 to 35,000 of these Slovak Jews had already been murdered in the Reinhardt camps. It follows that they cannot be included in the Höfle-Korherr number, otherwise it would be statistical double-counting. Further research is required to resolve this contradiction.

The radio telegram should be seen as an extremely condensed balance sheet of *Einsatz Reinhardt* for 1942 that was subsequently integrated into the overall Korherr Report, though the Korherr Report left out the numbers for each camp. Now, for the first time we know precisely how many Jews, according to Nazi officials, were sent to each of the Reinhardt death camps by the end of 1942. We know that Höfle's total sum of killings, reflected in Korherr's report, almost certainly was conveyed via Eichmann, Korherr, and Himmler to Hitler himself. A short document nearly sixty years old that survives only in British records of World War II can still teach us much about the Holocaust and lead us to address some unresolved issues. It is potent evidence of why governments should release intelligence records related to the war and the Holocaust.

Notes

1. Richard Breitman, *Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew* (London: The Penguin Press, 1999), pp. 236–45. The new British Labor government released to the Public Record Office in Kew the first tranche of Second World War decoded material—the German Police Decodes—in 1997. Many more volumes have followed. The Police Decodes are something of a misnomer, since they are not restricted to German Police radio messages, but cover radio transmissions from the whole range of SS and Police organizations, including the Waffen-SS. They also cover mundane subjects such as supplies of food and ammunition or personnel transfers between units, but also occasionally matters of serious historical importance. The latter is the case here. It should be noted that the decoded material was not always appreciated by British Intelligence, though transmitted on January 11, 1943, the messages were not decrypted and distributed until January 15, 1943.

2. Hermann Höfle: born June 19, 1911, Salzburg, trained as car mechanic, NSDAP and SS 1933, briefly imprisoned for political offenses in 1935, December 1939–August 1940 Selbstschutzhelfer in Neu Sandez (District Cracow), September 1940–February 1944 Staff SSPF Lublin, fall 1940 camp leader of a Jewish forced labor camp ("Globocnik's Ditch" near Belzec), 1942–43 organized deportations in the District of Lublin and from Warsaw ghetto, March 1944 officer (*Schutzhaftlagerführer*) in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen, July 1944 with HSSPF Greece, on May 31, 1945, together with Globocnik and other staff officers traced to an alpine hut near Weissensee (Carinthia/Austria) and arrested by soldiers of the "C" Squadron, 4th Queen's Own Hussars, eyewitness of Globocnik's suicide by cyanide at Schloss Paternion the same day, custody and escape from a US camp, arrested 1961, Höfle committed suicide August 21, 1962 in a Viennese prison before trial. BAB, BDC SSO Hermann Höfle; Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstands, file 11 545, Dieter Pohl, *Von der "Judenpolitik" zum Judenmord. Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouvernements 1939–1944* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 183–84, a summary of Höfle's SS records is in Joseph Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und seine Vollstrecker* (Frankfurt, Berlin; Wien: Ullstein, 1984), pp. 275–87.

3. Secrecy instructions by Höfle, July 18, 1942, Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie (henceforth APL), GDŁ 893, fol. 575–76, printed in Józef Kermisz, ed., *"Akcje" i "wysiedlenia" Dokumenty i materiały do dziejów okupacji niemieckiej w Polsce* (Warsaw; Łódź; Cracow, 1946), vol. 2, pp. 40–41.

4 List of staff officers SSPF Lublin and working staff of the General SS in the district of Lublin, undated (between early fall 1942 and mid-1943), BAB, BDC, SSO Odilo Globocnik

5 Franz Heim born on February 13, 1907 Catholic at first, later *gottgläubig* (the official Nazi non-church religion) By profession a pharmacist, he joined NSDAP and SA in 1930, a year later the SS From 1933 to 1934 unemployed, worked from 1935 for the SD At the beginning of the war active in an *Einsatzkommando* in Poland From the end of July to the end of August 1941 Deputy Commander of a “special tasks” (z b V) *Einsatzkommando* murdering Jews in former eastern territories of Poland SS-Oberfuhrer Schongarth made him deputy in Cracow in September 1941, a position Heim held until the beginning of 1943, when he fell seriously ill On March 1, 1943 promoted to SS-Standartenfuhrer Died of cancer February 19, 1944 BAB, BDC, SSO Franz Heim The authors wish to thank Dieter Pohl for information

6 Letter from Hofle’s office clerk SS-Oberscharfuhrer Franz Hoskowitz to the Commander of the Security Police and the SD Lublin, September 26, 1942, copying Archives of IFZ Munchen, Fb 95/23, see also “*Abteilg Reinhart*” in a letter from SSPF Lublin (Hoskowitz) to Section Population and Welfare Lublin, September 4, 1942; printed in Kermisz, *Dokumenty i materialy*, vol 2, p 39

7. See Joseph Wulf, *Vollstrecker*, pp 277–79, for a number of stunning examples

8 The abbreviations may have been the reason why British Intelligence seems not to have recognized the significance of the document The practice of using initial letters for the extermination camps was used in both Globocnik’s staff and Eichmann’s office Globocnik’s successor in Lublin, Jakob Sporrenburg, recalled that “Globocnik’s men would talk about Camp ‘S’”, Report on the interrogation of SS Gruppenfuhrer Jakob Sporrenburg, London, February 25, 1946, PRO, WO 208/4673 166970, fol. 14 In an interrogation Dieter Wisliceny remembered that the extermination camps were marked only with their initial letters in Eichmann’s office “Q What was Camp T?” “A If I correctly recollect, that belonged to the complex Lublin system I remember having heard the designation Camp T” “Q Was that also an annihilation camp?” “A Yes, Sir” Wisliceny recalled the Concentration Camp Lublin being marked M for Majdanek See interrogation Dieter Wisliceny, Nuremberg, November 15, 1945, fols 2–3, printed in John Mendelsohn, ed., *The Holocaust* (New York, London: Garland, 1982), vol 8, pp 72–73

9 The authors considered but rejected the suggestion that “L” could refer to the murderous Janowska camp in Lwów (Lemberg)

10 See Dieter Pohl, “Die großen Zwangsarbeitslager der SS- und Polizeifuhrer fur Juden im Generalgouvernement 1942–1945,” in Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, and Christoph Dieckmann, *Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager* (Gottingen Wallstein Verlag, 1998), vol 1, p 427

11 Józef Marszałek, *Obozy pracy w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie w latach 1939–1945* (Lublin Państwowe Muzeum na Majdanka, 1998), p 41

12 Labor Office Warsaw to Section Work, Chief of District Warsaw, May 7, 1941, APL, GDL, sygn 746, fol 310.

13. See Yitzhak Arad, *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka The Operation Reinhard Death Camps* (Bloomington, Indianapolis Indiana University Press, 1987), pp 383–89, Pohl, *Distrikt Lublin*, p 136, Thomas Sandkuhler, “*Endlosung*” in *Galizien Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die*

Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz: 1941–1944 (Bonn J H W Dietz, 1996), p 590, Tadeusz Mencel, ed, *Majdanek 1941–1944* (Lublin. Wydawnictwo Lubelski, 1991), p 443.

14. Several hundred Jews were kept alive for a time, as they were needed for the exhumations and cremations

15 Already in 1947 Szrojt guessed 600,000 victims of Belzec (Eugeniusz Szrojt, “Obóz zagłady w Belczu,” *Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni niemieckich w Polsce* (1947), p 44 Hilberg gave a sum total of 550,000 victims (*Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990), p 1299 Arad counted 414,000 from identified towns and townships, estimating 600,000 as the lowest possible number (*Belzec*, p 127) Marszałek calculated 500,000 (*Obozy pracy*, p 6) O’Neil based his calculation mainly on Martin Gilbert’s partly outdated *Atlas of the Holocaust*, and assumed over 805,000 (Robin O’Neil, “Belzec the ‘Forgotten’ Death Camp,” *East European Jewish Affairs* [EEJA] 28 2 [1998] pp 49–62). In a critique of O’Neil, Pohl and Witte summed up, from 480,000 to 540,000 (Dieter Pohl and Peter Witte, “The Number of Victims of Belzec Extermination Camp. A Faulty Reassessment,” *EEJA* 31 1 [2001], p 19) Michael Tregenza guessed “possibly up to one million victims”, Michael Tregenza, “Belzec Das vergessene Lager des Holocaust” in Ingrid Wojak and Peter Hayes, eds, “*Ansierung*” in *Nationalsozialismus Volksgemeinschaft, Raub und Gedächtnis Jahrbuch 2000* (Frankfurt, New York Campus Verlag, 2000), p 242

16 Wolfgang Scheffler, “Zur Zahl der in den Vernichtungslagern der ‘Aktion Reinhard’ ermordeten Juden” (historical expert opinion of July 3, 1973) in Helge Grabitz and Justizbehörde Hamburg, eds, *Täter und Gehilfen des Endlösungswahns Hamburger Verfahren wegen NS-Gewaltverbrechen 1946–1996* (Hamburg Ergebnisse Verlag, 1999), p 240

17 Historical expert opinion by Wolfgang Scheffler for the first Sobibor Trial at Hagen (1965), excerpted in Adalbert Rückerl, ed, *NS-Vernichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmo* (Munich Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977), pp 155–56 This does not necessarily mean that each number of a single deportation listed is correct per se But it is a known phenomenon in statistics that minor individual mistakes often compensate each other so that the sum may be approximately correct Arad calculated a minimum of 85,500 victims in 1942 (*Belzec*, pp 390–91)

18 Arad, *Belzec*, pp 127–28, 392–97 Scheffler’s total sum of 926,507 until August 1943 is evidently too high (Scheffler, “Zur Zahl,” p 240)

19 *Zugpaar* is a German railroad term for one train (not two as the term might suggest) which returns from its destination to the station where it started

20 Secret radio telegram Kruger to Himmler, December 5, 1942, BAB, NS 19/2655, fol 69, printed in Longerich, *Ermordung*, doc 83, pp 221–22, excerpted in English in Arad, *Belzec*, p 133

21 Christian Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg Hamburger Edition, 1999), p 727, n 1217

22 Scheffler in Rückerl, *NS-Vernichtungslager*, p 156, see also Grabitz, ed, *Täter und Gehilfen des Endlösungswahns*, p 232

23 Arnold Hindls was selected in Sobibor for the forced labor camp Staw Nowosiolka, where the trip of about 600 people to Sobibor on foot or in horse-drawn carts started on December

20, 1942 According to this report, many Jews succeeded in escaping from the march at first; about half of these were eventually shot. Only twelve returned to Nowosiolka and went into hiding. See Hindls, *Einer kehrte zurück. Bericht eines Deportierten. Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), pp. 58, 66–69. According to Sobibor survivor Zelda Metz, three men and sixteen young girls from this deportation were selected for work in the extermination camp. See testimony of Zelda Metz, 1945, first publ. in *Dokumenty Zbrodni i Męczeństwa* (Craców, 1945), quoted from Miriam Novitch, ed., *Sobibor. Martyrdom and Revolt* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1980), pp. 130–31. Another two survivors of Sobibor, Regina Zielinski and Esther Raab, also gave testimonies on this deportation at various German trials.

24 The question might arise if the identical figures transmitted by Höfle and a little later Korherr refer to total numbers killed or to the number killed plus the number subsequently selected for forced labor in smaller outside camps. For Belzec no such selections have ever been documented, and they seem highly unlikely. With reference to Sobibor, a number of selections from Dutch, French, and Belorussian transports to outside forced-labor camps such as Dorohucza, Trawniki, Old Airport Lublin, and the Concentration Camp Lublin (Majdanek) are reported for 1943, and thus need not be taken into account here. As for 1942, two selections in Sobibor for forced labor in Chelm district are well documented: 232 Jewish laborers out of 2,900 deportees (8%) on June 23, 1942, and 155 out of 2,000 deportees (7.8%) on August 9, 1942. Both reports mention previous selections in Sobibor, in particular of Czech, Slovak, and German Jews. However, most of the Jews assigned to the forced labor camps in Chelm district were sent back to Sobibor and murdered there before the end of 1942. Thus the total number of victims would not have been reduced. The same may hold for Treblinka and the selections there for the forced labor camp Treblinka I next door. Hindls, *Einer kehrte zurück*, p. 32–37. Factual report of a Jew deported from Slovakia and returned, August 17, 1943 (original in German: “*Tatsachenbericht eines aus der Slowakei deportierten und zurückgekehrten Juden*”), Moreshet Archives (Israel), D 1 1266. A rather unsuitable English translation is in Yad Vashem Archives, M-2/236, extract in Arad, pp. 140–41.

25 Historical expert opinion by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Scheffler in the Dusseldorf “Majdanek Trial” (1980), p. 173 (unpublished); Józef Marszałek, *Majdanek. Konzentrationslager Lublin* (Warszawa: Interpress, 1984), p. 141. The authors wish to thank Dr. Robert Kuwalek, Museum Majdanek, for generously sharing this and other information.

26. See in particular Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–1944. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996); this volume provides much information on the subject for East Galicia. A number of mass shootings which were counted as deportations to Belzec before are documented here; see also Sandkuhler, “*Endlösung*” in Galizien.

27 Date given in Globocnik’s letter to Himmler, November 4, 1943, p. 1, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (henceforth BAB), NS 19/2234, fol. 30, printed as PS-4024 in *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg 14. November 1945–1. Oktober 1946*, vol. 34, p. 68. See also Globocnik’s letter to von Herff, October 27, 1943, p. 2, BAB, BDC, SSO Odilo Globocnik. “*Einsatz Reinhardt*” has been completely shut down. The gassings in the General Government were stopped, the gas chambers completely destroyed. The killings of the Jews, the utilization of Jewish forced labor, and the plunder of their belongings went on, but were no longer Globocnik’s responsibility.

28 Report "Economic Part of Aktion Reinhardt," annex 1 to Globocnik's letter (State Secret) to Himmler, January 5, 1943 [read 1944], BAB, NS 19/2234, fol 35, printed as PS-4024 in *Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol 34, p 72

29 Space does not allow a detailed discussion of the thesis by Bertrand Perz and Thomas Sandkuhler that the *Aktion* may have also included the killing operations in Auschwitz from June 1942 ("Auschwitz und die 'Aktion Reinhard' 1942–45 Judenmord und Raubpraxis in neuer Sicht," *Zeitgeschichte* 5 (1999), p. 291

30 Secrecy instructions by Hofle, July 18, 1942, see n 3 See Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, *Faschismus, Getto, Massenmord Dokumentation über Ausrottung und Widerstand der Juden in Polen während des zweiten Weltkrieges* (Frankfurt Roderberg, n d), p 300 See also Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman, and Abraham Margalit, eds., *Documents of the Holocaust* (Jerusalem Yad Vashem, 1981), p. 274. Both editions chose the spelling "Reinhardt," whereas the original secrecy instructions and Kermisz (above) both read "Reinhardt "

31 Letter of Globocnik to SS Main Office and SS Gruppenführer von Herff, April 13, 1943, printed in *Faschismus, Getto, Massenmord*, pp 301–02

32 Radio telegram no 52, Chef Amtsgruppe D, signed by Richard Glucks to KL Auschwitz, September 15, 1942, copy in Johannes Tuchel, *Inspektion der Konzentrationslager 1938–1945 Das System des Terrors* (Berlin Edition Hentrich, 1994), p 176, Inspection of Auschwitz by SS Obergruppenführer Pohl on September 23, 1942, Special Archives Moscow, 502–1–19, fol. 86 (copy in *IG Farben Auschwitz Massenmord Über die Blutschuld der IG Farben Dokumentation zum Auschwitz Prozess* [Berlin Arbeitsgruppe der ehemaligen Haftlinge des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz beim Komitee der Antifaschistischen Widerstandskämpfer in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1964], doc 74, p 117), see also decode of radio telegram from Maurer (WVHA) to the Chief of Administration Auschwitz with reference line "Aktion Reinhardt," October 22, 1942, PRO, HW 16/21

33 Globocnik's letter (State Secret) to Himmler with annexes, January 5, 1943 (read. 1944), BAB, NS 19/2234, fols. 33–67, printed as part of PS-4024 in *Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol 34, p. 70–92.

34. See Richard Breitman and Shlomo Aronson, "Eine unbekannte Himmler-Rede vom Januar 1943," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 38 (1990), p 340 Most historians referred the *Aktion* to Reinhard Heydrich The well-known hypothesis of Robert L. Koehl, Uwe Dietrich Adam, Wolfgang Benz, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München, et al that *Einsatz* or *Aktion Reinhardt* was named after State Secretary of Finance Fritz Reinhardt is highly questionable The only interesting reference to the Reich Ministry of Finance to be found in the archives of the IfZ is a Declaration on Oath by Bruno Melmer, Nuremberg, February 11, 1948 (NG-4983) Fritz Reinhardt is not mentioned at all Another serious problem is that Melmer reported important events for May 1942 which actually took place in mid-August 1942 It will be difficult to explain why *Einsatz* or *Aktion Reinhardt* should have been named after a State Secretary whose ministry first became involved in the *Aktion* over two months after the first known occurrence of the code name

35 Breitman/Aronson, pp 343–44

36. Report and list of ancestors on the "racial" origin of former Naval First Lieutenant Reinhardt Heydrich by Dr Achim Gercke (NS Auskunft), June 26, 1932, BAB, BDC, SSO Rein-

hard Heydrich, fol 9–11, printed in Shlomo Aronson, *Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte von Gestapo und SD* (Stuttgart, 1971), pp 312–13. The first name *Reinhardt* is mentioned five times in these documents.

37. Blank questionnaire for the completion and correction respectively of officer's master file and the *Dienstaltersliste*, November 26, 1937, BAB, BDC, SSO Reinhard Heydrich.

38. Letter from Waffen SS Standortverwaltung Lublin, SS Stubaf Wippert, to SS- u. Polizeiführer *Reinhardt*, June 6, 1942, printed in Kermisz, *Dokumenty i materialy*, vol 2, p 182; copy in Archives IfZ München, Fb 95/23, fol 576, see Pohl, *Distrikt Lublin*, p 130, n 94.

39. Stamp on the copy of a letter by Hofle, September 9, 1942, in Helge Grabitz and Wolfgang Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren Ghetto Warschau, SS Arbeitslager Trawniki, Aktion Erntefest Fotos und Dokumente über Opfer des Endlösungswahns im Spiegel der historischen Ereignisse* (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1993), p 68.

40. See n 34.

41. The authors checked thirty-four copies of original documents: twenty-two documents had *Reinhardt* thirty-five times, eleven documents had *Reinhard* fifteen times, and one had both spellings. There can be no question of an equal use of both spellings.

42. Peter Witte, Michael Wildt, Martina Voigt, Dieter Pohl, Peter Klein, Christian Gerlach, Christoph Dieckmann, and Andrej Angrick, eds., *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42* (Hamburg: Christians, 1999), pp 233–34; Bogdan Musiał, "The Origins of 'Operation Reinhard': The Decision-Making Process for the Mass Murder of the Jews in the Generalgouvernement," *Yad Vashem Studies* XXVIII (2000), pp 116–18.

43. See Adalbert Ruckerl, *NS-Vernichtungslager, Arad, Belzec*, Pohl, *Distrikt Lublin*.

44. See Weekly Report of Sector Propaganda Lublin, March 28, 1942, quoted in Pohl, *Distrikt Lublin*, p 115. On April 17, 1942, Himmler had a conference with SSPF Warsaw, SS-Oberführer Arpad Wigand, and in all probability informed him about the beginning of construction work at Treblinka. See *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42*, p 399. The acceleration of the murders on the occasion of Himmler's visit to Warsaw was furthermore confirmed by an astounding intelligence report by a British Jewish prisoner of war who succeeded in escaping from the Warsaw ghetto and informing U.S. authorities in Lisbon. See letter Lisbon to OSS, June 20, 1942, NA, RG 226, Office of Strategic Services 26896 (copies courtesy of Richard Breitman), see Hilberg, *Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*, vol 3, pp 1190–91.

45. Radio telegram from SS-Brigadeführer Adolf Katz (SS Personnel Main Office) to SS-Sturmabführer Wilhelm Kment (official for conferring medals in Himmler's Personal Staff), January 15, 1945, BAB, BDC, SSO Odilo Globocnik.

46. Attested copy Himmler to Krüger, July 19, 1942, BAB, NS 19/1757, fol. 1 (NO-5574); printed in Peter Longerich and Dieter Pohl, eds., *Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden Eine umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945* (Zürich: Piper, 1989), doc. 74, p 201. On the acceleration of the murders see Christopher R. Browning, "A Final Decision for the Final Solution? The Riegner Telegram Reconsidered," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 10.1 (Spring 1996), pp 3–10, English quotation p 6, Pohl, *Ostgalizien*, pp 211–13.

47. See *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42*, p. 509, Eichmann interview by Willem Sassen, BAB, All. Proz., 6/95, pp 20–21, quoted in Christian Gerlach, "Failure of Plans for an

SS Extermination Camp in Mogilev, Belorussia," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 11.1 (1997), p. 75, n. 57

48 See Yaakov Lozowick, *Hitlers Bürokraten Eichmann, seine willigen Vollstrecker und die Banalität des Bösen* (Zürich, München: Pendo, 2000), p. 364, n. 104.

49 Himmler to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, January 18, 1943, BAB, NS 19/1577

50 Of these ninety-five transports four with 4,019 people were sent to the Warsaw ghetto in March/April 1942, and later to Treblinka, ten transports with about 18,000 people directly to Treblinka (District Warsaw) in September/October 1942. Eighty-one transports went to the Lublin district, Peter Witte, "Catalogue of Deportations" (unpublished manuscript)

51 On Korherr and the relevance of his reports in establishing a total number of victims see Georges Wellers, "The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report" in Serge Klarsfeld ed., *The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania* (New York: The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1978), pp. 139–62. In the Appendices, pp. 163–210, the two unabridged reports and most of the letters are reproduced. On the history of the Korherr Reports see Gerald Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985), pp. 135–39.

52 Himmler to Inspector of Statistics Dr. Richard Korherr, January 18, 1943, BAB, NS 19/1577, fol. 3, quoted in Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution*, p. 136.

53 Himmler to the Chief of the Reich Main Security Office (Müller), January 18, 1943, BAB, NS 19/1577, fol. 2, quoted in Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution*, p. 136.

54 Rudolf Aschenauer, ed., *Ich, Adolf Eichmann, Ein historischer Zeugenbericht* (Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1980), p. 474.

55 Inspector of Statistics Korherr to Dr. Rudolf Brandt, with First Korherr Report annexed, March 23, 1943, BAB, NS 19/1570 (letter NO-5195 and report NO-5194), copy of letter in Klarsfeld, p. 189, letter in English p. 190, report printed in German pp. 165–76, in English pp. 177–88.

56 Inspector of Statistics Korherr to Dr. Rudolf Brandt with second Korherr Report (NO-5193) annexed, April 19, 1943, BAB, NS 19/1570, copy of letter and report in Klarsfeld, pp. 207, 195–201, in English pp. 202–08.

57 *Ich, Adolf Eichmann*, p. 474. This was also confirmed by Erika Scholz, a secretary of IV B 4, who vividly remembered that she typed State Secret reports to Himmler on the actual state of the Final Solution of the Jewish Question in 1943. Protocol of interrogation Erika Scholz, June 24, 1966, vol. 7, p. 3–4, LG Berlin I Ks 1/69 (IV B 4 proceedings), protocol September 18, 1966, vol. 7, p. 3 (copies courtesy of Andrej Angrck, Berlin).

58 Jochen von Lang and Claus Sybill, eds., *Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police* (London: The Bodley Head, 1983), p. 113.

59 Klarsfeld, pp. 193–94, incorrectly translated twice "the camp" instead of "the camps."

60 *Durchgangslager* was originally a military technical term to designate provisional camps behind the front lines for new prisoners of war who were to be transported to POW camps farther in the rear. In a similar sense the term was used for camps receiving large numbers of *Volksdeutsche* before they were sent to their final places of settlement in the Reich.

61 Presumably the first killing site called a *Durchgangslager* was the camp in Soldau (Działdowo), established in winter 1939/40 “especially for the purpose of necessary inconspicuous liquidations” of Poles and handicapped people. See Interrogation of Dr. Dr. Otto Rasch, June 16, 1943, fol. 4, BAB, BDC, SSO Hans Krause (NO-1073), HSSPF Wilhelm Koppe to SSPF Jakob Sporrenberg, October 18, 1940, BAB, NS 19/2576

62 On *Durchgangslager Sobibor* see the correspondence between Himmler and Oswald Pohl under this subject line, July 1943, BAB, NS 19/1571; see further radio telegram HSSPF Russland Mitte to SSPF Lublin, October 27, 1943, PRO, HW 16/39. On Chelmno see Oskar Singer's entry in his diary, May 15, 1942, when he mentioned a *Durchgangslager* near Kolo as the aim of deportations. He did not yet know that it was Chelmno in fact. See Hanno Loewy and Gerhard Schoenberger, eds., *Unser einziger Weg ist Arbeit. Das Getto in Lodz 1940–1944. Ausstellungskatalog des Jüdischen Museums Frankfurt am Main*, (Frankfurt, Vienna: Locker, 1990), p. 204

63 See Eugen Kogon, Hermann Langbein, and Adalbert Ruckerl, eds., *Nazi Mass Murder: A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 5–6

64 Klarsfeld, pp. 171, 183. Again Klarsfeld's translation is incorrect

65 PRO, HW 16/97, Decode References, Call Signs, No. 3 Traffic

66 *Ich, Adolf Eichmann*, p. 474

67 Klarsfeld, pp. 171, 183, Karel Lagus and Josef Polák, *Město na mřížemi* (Prague: Naše vojsko, 1964), pp. 348–49

68 Klarsfeld, pp. 172, 183, Ladislav Lapscher, *Die Juden im Slowakischen Staat* (Munich, Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1980), p. 121